1. IT is generally agreed that, other things being equal, a considerable reduction in the inequality of incomes found in most modern communities would be desirable. But it is not generally agreed how this inequality should be measured. The problem of the measurement of the inequality of incomes has not been much considered by English economists. It has attracted rather more attention in America, but it is in Italy that it has hitherto been most fully discussed. The importance of the problem has been obscured by the inadequacy of the available statistics of the distribution of income in all modern communities.
To such statistics as we have, no very fine measures can be applied. The improvement of these statistics is the business of statisticians, but the problem of measuring and comparing the inequalities, which improved statistics would more precisely reveal, should be capable of theoretical solution now. No complete solution is presented in this paper, but only a discussion of certain points of principle and method.
2. First, as to the nature of the problem. An American writer has expressed the view that "the statistical problem before the economist in determining upon a measure of the inequality in the distribution of wealth is identical with that of the biologist in determining upon a measure of the inequality in the distribution of any physical characteristic." I But this is clearly wrong. For the economist is primarily interested, not in the distribution of income as such, but in the effects of the distribution of income upon the distribution and total amount of economic welfare,.,which may be derived from income. We have to deal, therefore, not merely with one variable, but with two, or possibly more, between which certain functional relations may be presumed to exist.
A partial analogy would be found in the problem of measuring the inequality of rainfall in the various districts of a large agricultural area. important is not rainfall as such, but the effects of rainfall upon the crop which may be raised from the land. Between rainfall and crop there will be a certain relation, the discovery of which will be a matter of practical importance. The objection to great inequality of rainfall is the resulting loss of potential crop. The objection to great inequality of incomes is the resulting loss of potential economic welfare.
Let us assume, as is reasonable in a preliminary discussion, that the economic welfare of different persons is additive, that the relation of income to econoinic welfare is the same for all members of the community, and that, for each individual, marginal economic welfare diminishes as income increases. Then, if a given income is to be distributed among a given number of persons, it is evident that economic welfare will be a maximum, when all incomes are equal. It follows that the inequality of any given distribution may conveniently be defined as the ratio of the total economic welfare attainable under an equal distribuition to the. total economic welfare attained under the given distribution. This ratio is equal to unity for an equal distribution, and is greater than unity for all unequal distributions. It may, therefore, be preferred to define inequality as this ratio minus unity, but for comparative purposes this modification of the definition is unnecessary. Inequality, however, though it mav be defined in terms of economic welfare, must be measured in terms of income.
3. Starting from the above definition, it is clear that, if we assume any precise functional relation between income and economic welfare, we can deduce a corresponding measure of inequality. It is also clear that, under this procedure, no one measure of inequality will emerge, whose appropriateness will be independent of the particular functional relation assumed.
The procedure suggested may be illustrated by two examples. Take, first, the hypothesis that proportionate additions to income, in excess of that required for "bare subsistence," make equal additions to economic welfare. This is Bernoulli's hypothesis, except that economic welfare is substituted for satisfaction.' It may, at first sight, lo0g Xg y t is sgt be thought that a still simpler, and practically equivalent, measure will be x, but this simplification raises a question to which Xq further reference will be made below.
The above hypothesis, however, is not satisfactory. Apart from the difficulty that only income in excess of that required for "bare subsistence" is taken into account, it is clear that too rapid a rate of increase of economic welfare is assumed, when income becomes large. After a certain point it is pretty obvious that more than proportionate additions to income will generally be required, in order to make equal additions to economic welfare. To be even tolerably realistic, a formula connecting income with economic welfare should satisfy the following conditions.
(1) Equal increases in economic welfare, at any rate after income is greater than a certain amount, should correspond to more than proportionate increases in income; (2) economic welfare should tend to a finite limit, as income increases indefinitely; (3) economic welfare should be zero for a certain amount of income, and negative for smaller amounts. These conditions are satisfied, if we assume that the relation of economic welfare to income is of the form dw u = so that w = c --, where c is a con-X2' X stant. For then, however large x becomes, w -can never become larger than c, and, when x is less than -, w is negative.' If we adopt this formula, which appears to be a good compromise of its kind between plausibility and simplicity, the corresponding measure of inequality islb1 rc--c--
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Xh where XA is the harmonic mean of the individual incomes, and ' If it were practicable to fix a unit of economic welfare, it would have to be fixed, in relation to the unit of income, so that both these attributes of c would hold good. There is no theoretical objection to this. c, as already stated, the reciprocal of the minimum income, which yields positive economic welfare.
Both the measures of inequality obtainled above are simple in form and have a certain theoretical elegance. But neither is readily applicable to statistics. The arithmetic mean is, indeed, easily calculated from perfect statistics, and fairly easily approximated to from imperfect statistics, but the corresponding calculations for the geometric and harmonic means are very laborious, when the number of individual incomes is large, and the corresponding approximations, especially for the harmonic mean, are practically impossible, where the statistics show more than a small degree of imperfection. The first of the two measures, moreover, involves an estimate of the income neeessary for "bare subsistence," and the second an estimate of the minimum income which yields positive economic welfare. And neither of these estimates are easily made. Nor, of course, have we really any precise knowledge of the functional relation between income and economic welfare.
4. Failing such precise knowledge, we may still lay down certain general principles, which shall serve as tests, to which various plausible measures of inequality may be submitted. We have, first, what may be called the principle of transfers. Maintaining the assumptions laid down in Section 2 above, we may safely say that, if there are only two income-receivers, and a transfer of income takes place from the richer to the poorer, inequality is diminished.1 There is, indeed, an obvious limiting condition. For the transfer must not be so large, as more than to reverse the relative positions of the two income-receivers, and it will produce its maximum result, that is to say, create equality, when it is equal to half the difference between the two incomes. And we may safely go further and say that, however great the number of income-receivers and whatever the amount of their incomes, any transfer between any two of them, or, in general, any series of such transfers, subject to the above condition, will diminish inequality.2 It is possible that, in comparing two distributions, in which both the total income and the number of income-receivers are the same, we may see that one might be able to be evolved from the other by means of a series of transfers Consider first the mean deviation from the arithmetic mean. This measure is the sum of two parts, one of which comprises the deviations above, the other the deviations below, the mean.1 It is a bad measure, judged by the principle of transfers, for it is unaffected by transfers within either part, provided that no income previously above the mean is reduced below it, and conversely. The transfer of a given sum from incomes above the mean to incomes below it, as, for example, by the provision of old age pensions for persons of small incomes from the proceeds of a tax on large incomes, would obviously reduce the mean deviation. But it would be unaffected, if such pensions were provided by a tax levied on those whose incomes were just below the mean, or if additional comforts for millionaires were provided from a tax on those whose incomes were just above the mean, provided that none of the latter were reduced below the mean by the tax.
The mean deviation is a measure of absolute dispersion. If we divide it by the arithmetic mean, we obtain what we may call the relative mean deviation, which is equally insensitive to transfers wholly above or wholly below the mean.
Consider next the standard, or mean square, deviation from the arithmetic mean,, i.e., the square root of the arithmetic average of the squares of deviations from the arithmetic mean. The standard deviation is perfectly sensitive to transfers,2 and thus passes our first test with distinction. Dividing the standard 1 Thus if S1 is the sum of the deviations of incomes greater than the mean and S2 the sum of the deviations of incomes less than the mean, the mean deviation = +(S.+?), where n is the total number of incomes. n a For, if a be the initial standard deviation of any distribution of n incomes, and 8' the standard deviation after an amount h has been transferred from an income x1 to an income X., all other incomes remaining the same, we have It is sensitive to transfers, in so far as these involve movements of the quartiles, but not otherwise. In this respect it is somewhat more sensitive than the mean deviation, but much less sensitive than the standard deviation. An interesting measure of dispersion, which has not, I think, hitherto attracted the attention of English writers, is Professor Gini's mean difference, which, as applied to incomes, is the arithmetic average of the differences, taken positively, between all possible pairs of incomes.2 It may be shown that this mean difference is equal to the weighted arithmetic mean of deviations from the median, the weights being proportionate; to the number of incomes, increased by one, which are intermediate in size between the median and the. income whose deviation is being considered.3 The mean difference, thus defined, is a measure of absolute dispersion. Dividing it by the arithmetic mean, we, obtain a measure of relative dispersion, which may be called the relative mean difference. The mean difference, whether absolute or relative, is perfectly sensitive to transfers.
Another interesting measure of inequality is based upon what some writers have called a Lorenz curve.4 (See next page.) This is a simple and convenient graphical method of exhibiting any distribution of income, provided that our interest is confined to proportions, rather than absolute amounts, both of total income and of the number of income-receivers.
Along the axis Ox are measured percentages of the total income, and along the axis Oy the minimum percentages of the total number of income-receivers, who receive various percentages of the total income. The proof was first given, apparently, by Professor Gini, Another most elegant proposition, due to Professor Ricci (ibid., pp. 32-33), is that, if any straight line be drawn parallel to the line of equal distribution, then all the Lorenz curves, to which this straight line is a tangent, represent distributions having the same relative mean deviation.
2 Professor Pigou (Wealth and Welfare, p. 25 n.) uses the following argument to prove that, in these circumstances, a reduction in the standard deviation will probably increase aggregate satisfaction.
" If A be the mean income and
It cannot be applied when either the total income or the number of income-receivers varies, or when both vary simultaneously. For these more general cases further tests are required, and three general principles suggest themselves as serviceable for this purpose. 7. We have, first, what may be called the principle of proportionate additions to incomes. It is sometimes suggested that proportionate additions to, or subtractions from, all incomes will leave inequality unaffected.' But, if the definition of inequality given above be accepted, this is not so. It appears, rather, that proportionate additions to all incomes diminish inequality, and that proportionate. subtractions increase it. This is the principle of proportionate additions to incomes just referred to. A general proof of this principle presents difficulties, and is not attempted here, but the proof in two important special cases is easy. For, first, assume, using the same notation as in Section 3 above, that the relation of income to economic welfare is wu=logx. Then, if 8 be the inequality of any given distribution, we have We know nothing to suggest whether the sum of the terms beyond the third is positive or negative. If, therefore, the third and following terms are small relatively to the second term, it is certain, and, in general, it is probable that aggregate satisfaction is larger, the smaller is (al2+a22+ ....
). This latter sum, of course, varies in the same sense as the .... standard deviation." This argument would be strong, if all deviations were small, i.e. if inequality were already very small. But when, as is the case in all important modern communities, a number of the deviations are very large, it is quite likely that successive terms in the expansion will go on increasing (numerically) for some time, and this is specially likely as regards the series of alternate terms, which involve deviations raised to even powers. This likelihood will vary according to the form of the function f, but it seems clear that the third and following terms cannot, in general, be neglected. It follows that, in general, there is no certainty and only a somewhat low and problematical degree of probability, that a reduction in the standard deviation will increase satisfaction. There is no reason to suppose that it is not at least equally probable that a reduction in certain other measures of dispersion will have the same effect. One good test of the relative appropriateness of various measures of the inequality of incomes would be the relative probability that a reduction in such measures would increase economic welfare (or satisfaction), ou the assumption that both the total income and the number of income receivers were constants.
But the evaluation of such relative probabilities presents difficulties. difficulties, though several writers have regarded the principle as so obvious that no proof is required.' But as a, corollary of the preceding principle the proof is easy. For, let the total additional income involved in proportionate additions to all incomes be redistributed among income-receivers in such a way as to make equal, instead of proportionate, additions to all incomes. Then the addition to maximum economic welfare attainable is the same in both caseis. But the addition to economic welfare actually attained is obviously greater, when additions to incomes are equal, than when they are proportionate. Therefore, inequality is smaller after equal additions have been made than after proportionate additions have been made, the total additional income being the same in both cases. But proportionate additions reduce inequality.
Therefore, a fortiori, equal additions reduce inequality.2 9. The third principle may be called the principle of proportionate additions to persons, and is to the effect that inequality is unaffected if proportionate additions are made to the number of persons receiving incomes of any given amount. This, again, is easily proved. For the maximum economic welfare attainable and the economic welfare actually attained will both have been increased in the same proportion, and hence their ratio will be unaltered.
10. We may now test, by means of these three principles, the measures of inequality which have already been tested by means of the principle of transfers. is any income, y the number of incomes greater than x, and A and a constants for any given distribution, but variables for different distributions.2 Assuming this formula for distribution, which, as Professor Bowley has shown,3 is the same thing as assuming that the average of all incomes greater than x is proportional to x, Professor Pareto treats a as the measure of inequality, in the sense that, the greater a, the greater inequality. It follows mathematically that "neither an increase in the minimum income nor a diminution in the inequality of incomes can come about, except when the total income increases more rapidly than the population." 4 In other words, increased production per head is both a necessary condition and a sufficient guarantee of a diminution of inequality. Professor Pareto's law, about which much has been written both by way of criticism and of qualified appreciation, implies a uniformity in distribution, which makes it impossible to apply either the principle of transfers or the principle of equal additions to incomes. Like the four other measures just considered, it is 1 It should be noticed that, if we are comparing the inequality of two distributions by means of a measure which is unchanged by proportionate additions to incomes, it is not necessary that the unit of money income in the two distributions should have approximately the same purchasing power. , or log n = 8 log s-log c, where s is the total income of the n richest income-receivers and 8 and c are constants for any given distribution. He proposes 3 as a measure of inequality, or "index of concentration," as he prefers to call it, such that, the greater X, the greater inequality. This formula is a more convenient variant of Professor Pareto's, a such that 8= ,and, as a diminishes from any quantity greater a-1, than one down to one, 8 increases up to infinity.
The equation log n= 8 log s -log c is easily transformed into that of a Lorenz curve. For, if N is the total number of incomereceivers and S the total income, we have log N = 8 log S -log c. Thus, the greater 8, the larger is the above area, and the larger the relative mean difference.' There is thus some ground for believing, though I do not here definitely commit myself to the belief, that the reciprocal of Professor Pareto's measure, is a mere variant of the relative mean difference, in the particular case, when distribution is approximately according to Pareto's law. In this particular case, then, Professor Pareto's measure would have no independent significance, and, in the more general case, when distribution may depart widely from Pareto's lahw, the measure has, of course, no general significance at all. It will, therefore, be provisionally set aside in this discussion.
12. Returning to the four measures set out in order of merit at the end of Section 10, this order is based on theoretical advantages. But account must also be taken of practical applicability to statistics. Both the relative mean deviation and the quartile measure are more easily applicable than either of their two rivals to perfect statistics, and applicable, with less risk of serious error, to imperfect statistics. As regards perfect, or nearly perfect, statistics, the advantage of the former pair over the latter relates only to laboriousness and not to accuracy, and is not, therefore, a matter of great importance. But, as regards markedly imperfect statistics, such as are actually available, the advantage relates to accuracy as well as to laboriousness and is, therefore, vital.
The provisional concluision which suggests itself, is as follows. When statistics are so imperfect, that neither the relative standard deviation nor the relative mean difference can be applied with any expectation of reasonable accuracy, we must make shift with the relative mean deviation and the quartile measure. It is some palliation of the comparative insensitiveness to transfers, which is a defect of both the latter measures, that each is sensitive to many possible transfers, to which the other is insensitive. If, therefore, both give the same result in any particular comparison, their evidence is to some extent corroborative.
If statistics are so far improved that the relative standard deviation and the relative mean difference are applicable, these arei to be preferred to the two measures just mentioned.
If a single measure is to be used, the relative mean difference is, perhaps, slightly preferable, owing to the graphical convenience of the Lorenz curve.
Probably, however, it will be desirable, at any rate for some time to come, not to rely upon the evidence of a single measure, but upon the corroboration of several. Given perfect, or nearly perfect, statistics, it is worth while considering whether corroboration may not also be sought from the measure log s , applied, for the sake of simplicity, to total incomes, and not to surplus incomes in excess of the requirements of "bare subsistence-." For this measure passes our test of proportionate additions to incomes, which none of the other four survivors do. In most practical cases, no doubt, these five measures will give results pointing in the same direction, but in some cases they may not do so.
Meanwhile, the chief practical necessity is the i'mprovement -of existing statistical informa.tion, especially as regards the smaller incomes. This paper may be compared to an essay in a few of the principles of brickmaking. But, until a greater abundance of straw is forthcoming, these principles cannot be put to the test of practice.
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